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The Rise and Fall of the Zaibatsu: Japan’s Industrial and Economic Modernization 
 
Japan has a history of being a fiercely independent and strong-willed nation.  From the 
repulsion of the Mongol horde in the Middle Ages to the projection of power throughout Eastern 
Asia in World War II, Japan has a long and storied tradition of deliberate prowess.  This tenacity 
and strength is reflected in the development of Japan’s modern government and economic 
structure at the turn of the century.  The Japanese people seized the opportunity to develop many 
of their own institutions and had the unique experience of forming a modern nation-state through 
careful selection of the best characteristics of Western government, society, and economy. At the 
same time, these adopted institutions assumed a uniquely Japanese flavor, which is most visible 
in the evolution of the Japanese economy and the conception of the business conglomerates 
known as zaibatsu following the Meiji Restoration in 1868.  As a result of the power and 
influence they wielded, the zaibatsu provide a case study of technocracy and corporate 
governance as catalysts for rapid economic development.   
As the Meiji Restoration saw the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and heralded a 
complete revolution in Japanese government and society, so too did the zaibatsu, or literally 
“financial clique,” experience a period of upheaval that was both profitable for some and ruinous 
for others.1  The development of the zaibatsu was a natural result of both the expansion of the 
old money changing businesses and the end of the Samurai class.  The Samurai class was phased 
                                                          
1 Thayer Watkins, “The Zaibatsu of Japan” San Jose State University, accessed December 29, 2016, 
http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins.htm. 
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out by the Meiji, almost all of their ancient benefits were stripped, and their traditional rice 
stipend was replaced with a one-time issuance of government bonds.  The Meiji government then 
sold the small industries which the Shogunate had spent years developing to the highest bidder, 
allowing many inspired tradesmen, known as the Meiji men, to engage in the privatization of 
industry.2  Many of the disenfranchised Samurai deposited their government-issued bonds to 
generate capital to start businesses; some of these men successfully bid on the government’s 
developed factors of production.  As the first generation of Meiji men began to retire, their sons 
took over their nascent businesses and expanded them, creating a network of family-controlled, 
fiercely prideful businesses that frequently collaborated with the new government.3  The 
masterminds behind the creation of this government knew that the inclusion of the zaibatsu in 
industrial and financial planning was essential to forming a working capitalist economy, and so 
formed an increasingly close relationship with these “financial cliques.”  One such zaibatsu, the 
Mitsui company, was even given the responsibility of creating a new currency and forming a 
national bank after the Meiji Restoration.4  By providing enough productive capacity to supply 
the materiel and services necessitated by Japan’s rapid territorial expansion, the zaibatsu gained 
an increasingly larger degree of state patronage.   Labor and resources were amply available due 
to Japanese conquest of the weak nations of Eastern Asia.  The zaibatsu thrived in this temporary 
environment of limitless demand and cheap sources of both labor and raw goods.5  These unique 
                                                          
2 Joshua Schenkein, Japan, The Great Power: Industrialization Through the Lens of Zaibatsu (USA: Amazon, Inc., 
2012), page #. 
3 Albert J. Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991). 
4 Watkins, “The Zaibatsu of Japan.” 
5 Schenkein, Japan, The Great Power, PAGE. 
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conditions allowed the phenomenon of the zaibatsu to become an entrenched fixture of the 
rapidly growing Japanese economy.   
Prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had no proper business firms in the modern 
sense of the term.  The merchant class, which happened to also be the lowliest and most 
frowned-upon social class in Tokugawa Japan, formed the backbone of the primitive economy 
that existed during the Edo period.6  Many of these small merchants operated their own money-
changing shops.  Trade between the two principal hubs of finance, Tokyo and Osaka, was 
heavily dependent upon these shops.  Tokyo markets operated on the gold standard and Osaka 
the silver.  These differences in money and standards of wealth measurement ensured that 
another resource, rice, became the standard by which wealth was measured and power 
maintained, and it was the key to the Japanese economy.7  Long before the Meiji Restoration, 
many Daimyo decided to sell rice tickets that served as placeholders for a certain amount of rice 
stored away in the lords’ granaries or even rice that had not been yet grown.  Revenue from these 
tickets served to fund required annual pilgrimages to Tokyo and the Daimyo’s extravagant court 
lifestyle.  Eventually, these tickets were accepted as valid currency throughout Japan.  Farmers 
themselves also discovered they could purchase or hoard rice during good harvests, then sell 
their reserves at a markup during a bad crop.  These rice exchanges were notorious for their 
shady tradesmen and underhanded sales tactics. The government attempted to control rice prices, 
even going so far as to hire ‘water men’ to throw buckets of water at the brokers to signal market 
close each day; but, price manipulation and insider trading still ran rampant in these largely 
                                                          
6 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
7 Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, Business Groups and the Big Push: Meiji Japan’s Mass Privatization and 
Subsequent Growth (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007), 10. 
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unsupervised and unorganized environments.8 This largely unregulated and primitive trade floor 
constituted Japan’s first futures market.   
The dramatic economic growth following the Meiji Restoration was facilitated by the 
establishment of banks. As previously stated, the laws that abolished the title of Samurai also 
converted their rice stipends into bonds; the first banks were formed to accept bond deposits.  
The money deposited into these banks was then lent out to businesses who used their newfound 
capital to finance a rapid expansion of industrial capacity.  Not ten years later, these same banks 
began to issue corporate stock.   Formal business entities like the corporation did not even exist 
prior to the Restoration, but after less than a decade banks became the first businesses in Japan to 
become publicly traded companies.  Unlike modern shares, these stocks served to divide 
ownership of the issuing companies rather than to raise capital, and so bank loans and bonds 
became the primary impetus for financing the growth of Japan’s private sector.9  Meanwhile, the 
development of the limited liability corporation ensured prospective owners could insulate their 
personal fortunes from the inherent risks of starting a new business. And start them they did – 
national wealth climbed rapidly in the closing decades of the 19th century, not only thanks to the 
advent of heavy industry, but also from the production of simple goods like rickshaws, lamps, 
and fertilizers that improved the standard of living for ordinary Japanese.  Trading and 
speculation in Japanese exchange markets did serve a place in Japanese money making, but 
carried a negative stigma associated with profiting off others’ labor.  The same pitched fever of 
the old rice markets permeated the new stock exchanges springing up across Japan and shares 
                                                          
8 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
9 Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, A Frog in the Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean – A History of Corporate 
Ownership in Japan (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 414. 
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fluctuated as the stories behind their pricing changed; tradesmen now saw shares not as 
ownership of a company but as a vehicle for wealth generation.  Rumors, even if they were 
found to be false, could have profound effects on pricing and market patterns.  Many traders only 
bought shares for short periods of time before selling them off to make a quick profit.10 This 
behavior made the new markets notoriously fickle, a trait which continued into the markets of the 
following century. 
The formation of these new financial institutions served as the foundation for the means 
of generating capital that the zaibatsu would use to expand their business empires.11  The 
zaibatsu themselves were the direct product of the Japanese interpretation and adaptation of the 
Western business firm.  They were to Japan what moguls such as John D. Rockefeller, Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, and Andrew Carnegie were to America. The difference between the American titans 
of industry and the Japanese was one of specialization; the zaibatsu concerned themselves not 
just with the domination of one industry, but with a wide spectrum of enterprises.  
Disenfranchised Samurai took the opportunity offered them by the formation of new banks to 
start businesses of their own; these men and their descendants continued to expand these 
conglomerates and broaden their reach across different industrial sectors.12  At the top of each of 
these pyramidal networks of different firms and business interests rested the family bank or 
trading company, which would manage the distribution of wealth to its subsidiaries.  The most 
successful of these businesses, which were the first proper zaibatsu, became known as the “Big 
Four”: these were Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Yasuda.13  Of course, there were dozens of 
                                                          
10 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
11 Watkins, “The Zaibatsu of Japan.”  
12 Morck and Nakamura, A Frog in the Well, 374. 
13 Takeo Hoshi and Anil Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 2001), 9. 
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other conglomerates that emerged after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) which qualified as 
zaibatsu but were known as “Second Tier Zaibatsu”.  These companies include familiar names 
such as Nomura, Kawasaki, and Nissan.  Of the principal zaibatsu, Sumitomo and Mitsubishi 
both had roots stemming from the Tokugawa period, while Mitsui and Yasuda were founded just 
after the Meiji Restoration.14   
These organizations played a pivotal role in Japan’s aspirations for territorial and 
economic expansion.  In the Imperial ideal of the era, a nation’s status as a world power 
depended on its access to raw materials, profitable and numerous colonial endeavors, and ability 
to project military power.  Japan’s imperial ambitions required a complete overhaul of its navy 
and army, and the government bought up everything from munitions and clothing to rations and 
coal in order to expedite the process of restructuring its armed forces.15  Just 30 years after the 
Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Empire of Japan had expanded its borders to include Korea, 
Manchuria, and Taiwan.  It is important to note the autonomy of this new, modern military from 
the civilian government; the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff office and its counterpart in 
the navy were responsible for all planning and execution of military operations. These offices 
reported directly to the Emperor and thus had inherent power over any established civilian 
government.16  The military was also deeply influenced by expansionist thought promoted by the 
state, and officers who conquered in the Emperor’s name drove Japanese soldiers onwards across 
Eastern Asia.  Influenced by the war-hawking of officers and widespread militarist ideology, this 
rapid projection of Japanese imperial power finally gave the zaibatsu and other companies the 
                                                          
14 Watkins, “The Zaibatsu of Japan.” 
15 Schenkein, Japan, The Great Power, PAGE. 
16 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
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land, labor, and access to raw goods needed to expand production to new heights.  The Japanese 
government was also committed to settling over five million Japanese citizens in the puppet state 
of Manchukuo set up to administer what was once Manchuria, and had already determined to 
establish modern farms and factories there to further fuel their massive war machine for a push 
into China.  The demand for war materiel was so great that the Japanese government awarded 
dozens of lucrative contracts to the Big Four as well as the new, “second-tier” zaibatsu.17  This 
rapid expansion, ironically, would eventually help to unseat the families in control of the 
zaibatsu from direct oversight and ownership of the companies which bore their names.   
The private owners of these companies realized that they could raise twice as much 
capital and still maintain direct control over their business ventures by allowing 49 percent of 
shares of their principal holding company to be sold publicly, which would prop up the price of 
their shares as well as supply revenue from which they could fund still more business enterprises.  
For each of these new enterprises, up to 49 percent of shares could be sold, dramatically 
increasing the capital under the command of the zaibatsu while still allowing for direct control of 
each of their subsidiaries.  At the same time, the families themselves and their vast fortunes were 
insulated from any legal action or financial loss in any of their subsidiaries; each one was 
independently incorporated and had its own distinct group of shareholders.18  This pyramidal 
structure was the conglomerates’ answer to meeting the rapidly increasing demand from the 
Japanese government.  From 1912 to 1930, as the zaibatsu became ever more complex and 
sophisticated, the lower tiers of these pyramids were constantly reshuffled and restructured 
according to their profitability.  Early on, in 1909, the Mitsui Council restructured their 
                                                          
17 Morck and Nakamura, Business Groups, 23. 
18 Morck and Nakamura, Business Groups, 25. 
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businesses for the second time, completely rearranging firms and organizing them so the more 
profitable, solvent firms were placed closer to the holding company and the weaker firms were 
placed closer to the base of the pyramid.19  This business practice insulated the parent company 
from the majority of losses suffered by these more unprofitable businesses, since the lower down 
on the pyramid a business was placed, the greater the portion of shares owned by public 
shareholders who had nothing to do with the zaibatsu leadership.   
This period of stability and profitability was not fated to last.  The popularity of 
militarism and military adventurism had quickly grown and spread through the ranks of the 
Japanese armed forces and civilian population, reaching its zenith in the 1930’s.  The Japanese 
victories of the past few decades fed the flames of patriotism and military jingoism.  The Taisho 
period ushered in a time of democracy in Japan, and this civilian government made attempts to 
encourage peaceful relationships with other nations.20  For a time, a policy of peace was 
preeminent in Japanese foreign policy.  However, the implosion of world commerce following 
the stock market crash of 1929 paired with the government’s consent to international requests to 
limit its naval power in 1930 both angered and emboldened the military.  Ultranationalist secret 
societies sprang up within the military and sought to gather sufficient support and power to 
unseat the democratic government.  In 1932, this period of civil democracy was brought to a 
decisive end by the assassination of the Prime Minister on the orders of one of these officer 
societies.  The assassins were put on trial and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, but the 
public largely saw the officers as acting out of a patriotic duty to the Emperor.  The military 
                                                          
19 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
20 Tetsuji Okazaki, The Japanese Firm: Sources of Competitive Strength, (Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
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never fully succeeded in establishing a dictatorship, but by World War II many army and navy 
officers concurrently held important positions within the nominally civilian government.21  
  
Condemning the “short-term focus” of the various zaibatsu families, the military was 
able to engineer a significant public outcry against these “anti-patriotic” families.  They took full 
control of the financial and strategic decision making capabilities of the zaibatsu, whose 
controlling families were largely stripped of their assets and any leadership roles within the 
companies.22  This was possible thanks to the weak economy in Japan and of the entire world 
during the 1930’s.  This weakness and apparent impotence of world markets to recover 
convinced many Japanese, common workers and wealthy business owners alike, that capitalism 
had failed as a socioeconomic system.  With widespread public support, the process of 
nationalization of the financial sector and many zaibatsu began in earnest.  In 1926, there were 
1,402 different banks operating in Japan.  By 1945 only 61 remained.23  The banking system was 
protected by the government but also enclosed and cut off from real decision-making; the 
government could simply remove and replace any of the handful of people who controlled the 
banking system if they so desired.  After the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 
(World War II), the military passed new laws that forced the zaibatsu to reorganize their holding 
companies into joint stock ventures or face exorbitant tax rates.  The government then also 
severely restricted the income of the leading families by placing the issuance of dividends under 
control of the state; because the zaibatsu were overseeing joint stock companies and not limited 
                                                          
21 Okazaki, The Japanese Firm. 
22 Morck and Nakamura, A Frog in the Well, 414. 
23 Okazaki, The Japanese Firm. 
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partnerships, their only source of income were the dividends paid to them by the company24.  
The families lost practically all significant sources of income at this point.  One might look at the 
rapid expansion of the Sumitomo group from 1937 to 1945 on retained earnings alone and 
wonder what sources the Sumitomo family could have relied on for income.  The Sumitomo 
group grew by 32% during this period, it appears that the Sumitomo family (along with others) 
relied on loans from group banks for income.25  The existence of these loans placed financial 
institutions in a strengthened position during the reconstruction that was about to begin.  
With the zaibatsu largely out of the picture, the State Planning Ministry was founded and 
in 1940 announced an “Outline of the Establishment of a New Economic System.”  This system 
would force firms to operate without issuing shares, and instead be required to meet a system of 
quotas26.  These planners also controlled the prices of goods produced throughout the nation and 
across the Empire.  Unrealistic quotas and poor planning ensured that by 1942 Japan was in 
financial crisis, as many firms had not been able to meet production quotas.27  Firms actually 
began to refuse to meet these standards in order to turn a profit on the goods they managed to 
manufacture.  Central planners attempted to correct for these issues by implementing new 
incentives and corporate governance standards, which were met only with limited success.  By 
1944, the composition of private consumption in gross national expenditure had fallen to less 
than 60 percent of its 1936 level.28  In fact, by the time the United States occupation force 
                                                          
24 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
25 Morck and Nakamura, A Frog in the Well, 421. 
26 Morck and Nakamura, A Frog in the Well, 422. 
27 Hoshi and Kashyap, Corporate Financing, 60. 
28 Okazaki, The Japanese Firm. 
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entered Japan, the question had become not whether the economy could recover, but how to go 
about completely rebuilding it.   
At the end of World War II, not only had the military nationalized a large portion of 
zaibatsu holdings, but remaining assets were severely damaged by the conflict.  The military 
economic advisors who came to Japan with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) were Americans whose memories were still fresh with thoughts of the Great Depression.  
These Keynesian economists recommended and implemented liberal fiscal and monetary policies 
similar to those of the American New Deal under President Roosevelt.  Fourteen zaibatsu were 
targeted for destruction, but only ten of the fourteen were ever actually dismantled by SCAP.29  
In 1945, General MacArthur suggested that the zaibatsu themselves walk the Americans through 
how best to dissolve them.  Needless to say, a commission of the most powerful zaibatsu went to 
work with a great deal of enthusiasm, fervently jumping at the chance to hide their assets.  As 
more experienced economists arrived from America, this plan was quickly abandoned.30  Finally, 
in 1948, SCAP came up with a list of 325 companies, mostly zaibatsu subsidiaries, to be broken 
up and sold back to the public.  MacArthur envisioned the sale of these assets would provide the 
first step to establishing a middle class in Japan.  Again, though, only 18 were ever actually 
dissolved.31  Some zaibatsu families managed to conceal a small portion of their former wealth 
and attempted to ensure the firms that they once managed were not broken up and sold.  In some 
cases, like that of Nomura Group, the company’s employees were allowed the first chance to 
purchase shares in Nomura subsidiaries.  Unknown to SCAP, these loyal employees had been 
                                                          
29 Gary D. Allinson, Japan’s Postwar History (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 75. 
30 Masahiko Aoki and Hyung-Ki Kim, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the 
Role of Banks (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Office of the Publisher, 1995) 373. 
31 Allinson, Japan’s Postwar History, 76. 
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lent money by each Nomura firm to purchase stocks and hold them until they could be sold back 
to the Nomura Group at a later date.  Some others, like Sumitomo, were able to retain their vast 
holdings of real estate, as the Americans could not see the value of lands that had been ravaged 
by war and largely ignored these acquisitions.32  This oversight provided a financial shelter for 
many companies. However, SCAP managed to irrevocably change the zaibatsu system: in 1946 
one in four stocks were held by zaibatsu; by 1950, this number was reduced to only one in 
twenty.  Eventually, ownership of these shares passed primarily to individual investors and 
financial institutions.  
After the Treaty of San Francisco was signed in 1952 and the SCAP post was made 
permanently vacant, the Japanese government relaxed some of the laws banning several key 
features of zaibatsu.  During this period, new businesses referred to as keiretsu were formed 
from the bits and pieces of the zaibatsu left behind after the departure of the Allied occupation 
forces33.  Many of these organizations are still in existence today, some even with their old 
financial institutions at the helm.  Instead of being owned and managed by a single family, 
however, ownership of these companies has passed to individual shareholders.  The keiretsu are 
much looser organizations of firms, and do not hold the same pyramidal structure as the zaibatsu 
once did.  However, throughout the second half of the 20th century they still wielded great 
influence on Japanese economic and military policies.34   
During this time, the Japanese government made it a priority to nurse its weak postwar 
economy back to health, often at the expense of other social goals.  Over time, Japan’s economic 
                                                          
32 Alletzhauser, The House of Nomura. 
33 Taggart R. Murphy, “The Keiretsu and the Japanese Economy.” The Asia-Pacific Journal 1 June 2008, accessed 
December 26, 2016, http://apjjf.org/-R-Taggart-Murphy/2790/article.html. 
34 Allinson, Japan’s Postwar History, 103. 
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goals evolved from simply restoring some semblance of normalcy to equaling or perhaps 
surpassing the United States as the world’s premier economic powerhouse.  For a time, it 
appeared Japan was well on its way to doing just that; economic development benefited from an 
exceptionally educated population that was willing to go to extraordinary lengths to provide for 
their families. The keiretsu were the second pillar of Japan’s rapid economic growth during this 
period.  Companies that agreed to form keiretsu benefited from reciprocal stock ownership, 
which allowed them to gain excessive financial strength and a network of support that allowed 
them to outperform both foreign and domestic companies.   Management was focused not on 
producing capital but on gaining market share in the long-term, which dramatically increased 
product exposure to market forces.  They frequently pursued pet projects in high growth sectors, 
which, coupled with their long-term mindset, had the potential to be wildly profitable.  This 
market was one of extreme competition, and companies would frequently accept failure after 
failure to avoid embarrassment in front of rivals rather than admit defeat or surrender market 
share to competitors.  Fierce competition ensured that companies were quick to adopt new 
innovations in production or technology; however, many of these ideas were repurposed from 
those of foreign companies.  The Japanese government acted as a business partner for many of 
these firms and offered administrative oversight and extraordinarily cheap credit.  They also 
offered a business environment protected by tariffs, which allowed zaibatsu to grow quickly at 
the expense of the Japanese consumer.35  Eventually, the bubble of cheap credit and bad 
corporate debt would pop, sending the Japanese economy into a severe recession.  
                                                          
35 Robert J. Crawford, “Reinterpreting the Japanese Economic Miracle.” Harvard Business Review January-
February 1998, accessed December 30, 2016, https://hbr.org/1998/01/reinterpreting-the-japanese-economic-miracle. 
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Since their conception, the holding corporations of the keiretsu had been slowly selling 
off more of their partners’ shares, further weakening formal and financial ties between different 
businesses.  The keiretsu system was once more endangered in the 1990’s when Japan entered 
their deepest recession since the end of World War II.  Many banks were forced to merge or 
close their doors, causing the lines between traditional keiretsu to blur together.  Still more banks 
sold shares off to finance their own business and lost control over subsidiary companies.  The 
keiretsu system as it exists today is one of informal relationships between different companies 
that once served as part of the same holding group.  A few of these relationships continue to be 
backed by a system of mutual shareholding, but this practice is slowly dying out.  Companies are 
no longer easily bailed out by large parent banks, and so the keiretsu system has deteriorated 
further into a loose mass of alliances between individual firms, albeit one that still manages to 
serve as a cornerstone of Japanese economy and society.36 
It is difficult to overstate the effect the zaibatsu had on the development of the modern 
Japanese nation.  Through these organizations, Meiji Japan managed to industrialize and expand 
faster than any state in history.  Militaristic ambition and demand for raw goods to fuel a 
growing Japanese economy provided the zaibatsu with desperate markets hungry for their goods 
and services.  Financial institutions with shadowy roots in the Tokugawa period developed into 
fully fledged securities, stocks, and futures exchanges.  These institutions, along with the 
establishment of formal banking systems, provided the capital the zaibatsu needed to begin their 
rise to power.  The zaibatsu structure began as a uniquely Japanese interpretation of the Western 
cartel or monopoly, in the style of the American industrial tycoons.  As Japan became 
increasingly militaristic and confident in its martial ability, the officer cadre slowly gained more 
                                                          
36 Murphy, “The Keiretsu and the Japanese Economy.” 
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control over the civilian government and was able to initiate conflicts subversively with 
neighboring nations such as China and the United States that eventually ended in defeat.  
Meanwhile, the zaibatsu were heavily nationalized and transformed into state-run firms and after 
the war they were disbanded and outlawed by the American occupation forces.  As one studies 
the rise and fall of the zaibatsu alongside that of their government, one can all too easily draw 
parallels to the handful of modern American financial institutions considered “too big to fail.”  
As we look forward to a bright future of an increasingly expanding and globalized economy, it is 
exceedingly important to recognize and learn from not only the lessons in power, nepotism, and 
corruption but also those in innovation, organization, and efficiency a case study of the Japanese 
zaibatsu so gracefully provides.   
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